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The article presents an overview and analysis of international legal regulations on climate 
change. The authors examine how the international regime related to climate change 
has evolved in multilateral agreements. A special focus is put on the principle of common 
but differentiated responsibilities which became the basis of discord among states in 
discussing targets and responsibilities in climate change mitigation. The authors note 
that in 2015 the international climate change regime entered a new stage where the 
most important role is determined for developing countries, both in the legal and in the 
financial infrastructure, and in the formation of an international climate change policy.
The importance of the participation of Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa 
(BRICS) in an international climate change regime has been recognized for some time. 
The article describes the policy and regulations on climate-related issues in BRICS. The 
authors compare the key actions and measures BRICS have taken for complying with 
international climate change documents. They highlight that global climate change 
action cannot be successful without BRICS countries’ involvement. BRICS must therefore 
make adequate efforts in emissions reduction measures and significant commitments 
in respect of the international climate change regime. The authors propose three major 
steps for BRICS to take the lead in dealing with climate change. First, BRICS need to foster 
further discussion and cooperation on climate issues and work out an obligatory legal 
framework to fight climate change collectively as well as unified legislation at their 
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domestic levels. Second, Russia and other BRICS countries have the potential to cooperate 
in the field of renewable energy through the exchange of technology, investment in 
the sector, and the participation of their energy companies in each other’s domestic 
market. Assuming Russia will support the development and enhancement of renewable 
technologies in BRICS countries, it can take a leadership position in the group. Third, in 
the international process of tackling climate-related issues BRICS should act as a bloc. 
Russia’s distancing itself from its partners is considered a deficiency in strengthening the 
BRICS countries’ role in global governance. BRICS are capable of serving as a vigorous 
platform in driving climate change negotiations leading to effective binding regulations 
in 2020–2030 and, provided that the countries cooperate successfully, BRICS will carry 
the combined weight of the entire group in the global arena.
Keywords: BRICS countries; climate change; emissions reduction; international 
agreements; common but differentiated responsibilities.
Recommended citation: elena gladun & Dewan ahsan, BRICS Countries’ Political 
and Legal Participation in the Global Climate Change Agenda, 3(3) BriCs law Journal 
8–42 (2016).
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1. Introduction
one of the global objectives of sustainable development set forth by the 
international community is to improve the quality of life within the constraints 
of the natural environment. The primary way to achieve this is to mitigate global 
BRICS LAW JOURNAL    Volume III (2016) Issue 3 10
climate change. The global problem of climate change is addressed in the plethora 
of international documents which have formed the legal framework governing 
the activities of states to reduce greenhouse gas (ghg) emissions, to create and 
implement the best technologies, and to cooperate in the area of protecting the 
ozone layer. By the mid-1980s, the accumulating observed evidence of actual ozone 
layer depletion was a key factor leading countries into the era of climate change. 
The politics of global climate change are as complex as the science underpinning 
the debate. state, regional and multilateral efforts to address climate change differ 
in scope, focus and style.1 There is also great diversity in the social and legal systems 
in the states that have undertaken to regulate climate issues. Different countries 
have widely divergent histories, levels of wealth, economic conditions, cultures, and 
systems of government and laws, hence, they regulate environmental protection 
according to their own conceptions, legal instruments, and national norms. some 
countries are more experienced in regulating efficiently matters related to the natural 
environment, while others have little experience in using regulatory instruments in 
respect of this question. 
The problem of climate change, however, cannot be solved by the efforts of any 
one country acting alone. successful climate change mitigation, firstly, will require 
global consensus and efficient global environmental agreement on the appropriate 
response to climate change. The effectiveness of such an agreement depends on the 
participation of both developed and developing nations. all countries acknowledge 
the need to reduce ozone-depleting emissions though some developed countries are 
reluctant to ratify climate change agreements, for instance the Kyoto Protocol,2 and 
developing countries lack adequate commitment to reduce their emissions. it is crucial 
that all governments comply with international agreements and not set emissions 
reduction targets with ambiguous sustainability goals, which only undermines 
long-term efforts at the domestic level, i.e. replacement of state policy, extensive 
amendments in legislation, and special judicial or administrative measures.3
This paper analyzes the efforts of Brazil, russia, india, China, and south africa 
(BriCs) in complying with the existing international climate change regime as well 
as the transformation in their domestic policy and regulations addressing climate 
change in the last decade. The objective of the research is to determine the role of the 
1  Cinnamon Carlarne, Risky Business: The Ups and Downs of Mixing Economics, Security and Climate Change, 
10 melb. J. int’l l. 439 (2009).
2  The rationale for the previous united states administration’s not ratifying the Kyoto Protocol was partly 
based on the lack of commitment to ghg emissions reduction by developing nations. See Philippe 
Tulkens & henry Tulkens, The White House and the Kyoto Protocol: Double Standards on Uncertainties 
and Their Consequences, Feem Working Paper 89.2006 (2006) (Jun. 12, 2016), available at http://
ageconsearch.umn.edu/bitstream/12063/1/wp060089.pdf.
3  michael Burger et al., Rethinking Sustainability to Meet the Climate Change Challenge, 43 envtl. l. rep. 
news & analysis 10342, 10345 (2013).
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BriCs countries in the future global response to climate change and to propose steps 
that russia needs to adopt in order to be capable of taking the lead in this area.
2. The Evolution of Multilateral Environmental Agreements  
on Climate Change
The Vienna Convention for the Protection of the ozone layer (1985) became the 
first document establishing the duty of state Parties to
adopt appropriate legislative or administrative measures and cooperate in 
harmonizing appropriate policies to control, limit, reduce or prevent human 
activities under their jurisdiction or control should it be found that these 
activities have or are likely to have adverse effects resulting from modification 
or likely modification of the ozone layer (article 2).4 
The Convention provided a list of chemical substances which have the potential 
to modify and deplete the properties of the ozone layer. in addition, the document 
required participating countries to adopt legislative measures to control and 
limit the behavior of individuals within a state’s jurisdiction to prevent them from 
conducting activities which are shown to cause further depletion of the ozone 
layer. The participants also agreed to cooperate in the research effort to determine 
which human activities effect the depletion of the ozone layer, although individual 
participating countries had the latitude to exploit their own resources in accordance 
with their own environmental policies.5 generally speaking, this document was of 
a framework nature and imposed no specific obligations on the signatory countries 
in reducing consumption and production of ozone-depleting substances (oDs). 
in 1987, the montreal Protocol6 amended the Vienna Convention by specifically 
providing for the Parties’ gradual reduction in the production and consumption of 
chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) and other ozone-depleting chemicals. The montreal 
Protocol also set controls on the trade of such chemicals with non-Parties. in 1990, 
the london amendment to the montreal Protocol strengthened these control 
measures by requiring the Parties to phase out the production of CFCs by the year 
2000, and to gradually phase out other controlled substances by 2005.7 subsequently, 
4  Vienna Convention for the Protection of the ozone layer (with annexes i & ii), uneP Doc. ig.53/5, 26 
i.l.m. 1529 (1987).
5  Jeffrey m. Pollock & Jonathan s. Jemison, The Emerging of International Environmental Law, 195-Feb. 
new Jersey lawyer 25 (1999).
6  montreal Protocol on substances that Deplete the ozone layer, 26 i.l.m. 1550 (1987).
7  The evolution of the montreal Protocol, amendments, ozone secretariat (uneP) (Jul. 28, 2016), available 
at http://ozone.unep.org/en/handbook-montreal-protocol-substances-deplete-ozone-layer/27608.
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a number of amendments were adopted extending the list of banned substances,8 
banning the import of the controlled substances from any state not a Party to the 
Protocol as well as establishing and implementing a system for licensing the import 
and export of controlled substances,9 and establishing deadlines for the production 
and consumption of these substances.10 
The montreal Protocol divides its Parties into categories – developed and 
developing countries, but only countries under the latter category have special 
rights. This mechanism is based on the principle of common but differentiated 
responsibilities and has a crucial meaning for international cooperation. article 5, 
paragraph 1 of the Protocol provides delayed compliance for developing countries; 
it reads:
any Party that is a developing country and whose annual calculated level 
of consumption of the controlled substances in annex a is less than 0.3 
kilograms per capita on the date of the entry into force of the Protocol for it, 
or any time thereafter until January 1, 1999, shall, in order to meet its basic 
domestic needs, be entitled to delay for ten years its compliance with the 
control measures set out in articles 2a to 2e.11
This means that every developing country is granted a grace period if its emissions 
are below a certain threshold (making them “article 5, paragraph 1 Parties”).12 The 
10-year grace period that was arranged made it possible to require developing 
countries to meet the same obligations as developed countries.13 The montreal 
Protocol accordingly provides another mechanism for developing countries – 
a special fund to facilitate implementation. This emphasizes that developing 
8  The Copenhagen amendment (1992): The amendment to the montreal Protocol agreed by the Fourth 
meeting of the Parties, ozone secretariat (uneP) (Jul. 28, 2016), available at http://ozone.unep.org/
en/handbook-montreal-protocol-substances-deplete-ozone-layer/27610.
9  The montreal amendment (1997): The amendment to the montreal Protocol agreed by the ninth 
meeting of the Parties, ozone secretariat (uneP) (Jul. 28, 2016), available at http://ozone.unep.org/
en/handbook-montreal-protocol-substances-deplete-ozone-layer/27611.
10  The Beijing amendment (1999): The amendment to the montreal Protocol agreed by the eleventh 
meeting of the Parties, ozone secretariat (uneP) (Jul. 28, 2016), available at http://ozone.unep.org/
en/handbook-montreal-protocol-substances-deplete-ozone-layer/27612.
11  montreal Protocol, art. 5, para. 1.
12  Pieter Pauw et al., Different Perspectives on Differentiated Responsibilities: A State-of-the-Art Review 
of the Notion of Common but Differentiated Responsibilities in International Negotiations, german 
Development institute / Deutsches institut für entwicklungspolitik Discussion Paper 6/2014 (2014) 
(aug. 8, 2016), available at https://www.die-gdi.de/uploads/media/DP_6.2014.pdf.
13  sarah Davidson ladly, Border Carbon Adjustments, WTO-law and the Principle of Common but 
Differentiated Responsibilities, 12 international environmental agreements 63 (2012).
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countries are minor contributors to current global climate problems, have lower 
capacities, and still have high levels of poverty that need to be addressed first.14 
in 1992, the united nations Framework Convention on Climate Change was 
adopted and signed by most of the countries of the world. The ultimate objective 
of this Convention
is stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level 
that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate 
system. such a level should be achieved within a time frame sufficient to 
allow ecosystems to adapt naturally to climate change, to ensure that food 
production is not threatened and to enable economic development to 
proceed in a sustainable manner.15
The Convention divides countries into three main groups according to differing 
commitments. annex i Parties include the industrialized countries that were 
members of the organization for economic Co-operation and Development (oeCD) 
in 1992, plus countries with economies in transition (the eiT Parties), including the 
russian Federation, the Baltic states, and several central and eastern european states. 
annex ii Parties consist of the oeCD members of annex i, but not the eiT Parties. 
The countries in annex ii are obliged to assist the developing country Parties that 
are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change in meeting the 
costs of adaptation to those adverse effects. They are required to “take all practicable 
steps to promote, facilitate and finance, as appropriate, the transfer of, or access to, 
environmentally sound technologies and know-how to other Parties, particularly 
developing country Parties, to enable them to implement the provisions of the 
Convention.”16
Thus, the developed countries that are Parties to the Convention obligate 
themselves to take the lead in dealing with this problem by promising to implement 
national policies and to take the corresponding measures to assist in the reduction 
of greenhouse gases. 
non-annex i Parties (the third group) are mostly developing countries. Certain 
groups of developing countries are recognized by the Convention as being especially 
vulnerable to the adverse impacts of climate change, including countries with low-
lying coastal areas and those prone to desertification and drought. others (such as 
countries that rely heavily on income from fossil fuel production and commerce) 
14  Joanna Depledge & Farhana Yamin, The Global Climate Change Regime: A Defence in The Economics 
and Politics of Climate Change 433 (D. helm & C. hepburn, eds., oxford university Press, 2009).
15  united nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, art. 2 (aug. 1, 2016), available at https://
unfccc.int/resource/docs/convkp/conveng.pdf.
16  Id. art. 4, paras. 4, 5.
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feel more vulnerable to the potential economic impacts of climate change response 
measures. The Convention emphasizes activities that promise to answer the special 
needs and concerns of these vulnerable countries, such as investment, insurance, 
and technology transfer.17 Funding provided by annex ii Parties is channeled mostly 
through the Convention’s financial mechanisms.
Despite the commitments declared by the Convention on Climate Change, it 
places no legally binding requirements on the Parties. The Kyoto Protocol of 1997, 
however, amended the Convention by imposing the specific legal requirements that 
the initial agreement lacked.18 in particular, the Kyoto Protocol’s major feature is that 
it has mandatory targets on ghg emissions for the world’s leading economies that 
have accepted it.19 Thus, it requires industrialized and developed countries to reduce 
the emissions of greenhouse gases to 5% below 1990 levels between 2008 and 2012, 
although it specifically declines to extend the reduction of emissions requirement to 
developing countries. Further, based on the Fourth assessment report of the inter-
governmental Panel on Climate Change (iPCC),20 industrialized countries need to 
achieve aggregate emissions cuts of 25%–40% by 2020 in order to limit global warming 
to 2˚C. To achieve these objectives, the Kyoto Protocol provides three mechanisms 
for countries to control their emissions through flexible arrangements. For trade with 
developing countries, the Kyoto Protocol created a Clean Development mechanism 
(CDm) that accepts contributions from industrialized countries, invests in emissions 
abatement in developing countries, and obtains certified emissions reductions in 
return, which it credits to the industrialized investor countries’ targets. The CDm can 
be seen as a vehicle for “joint implementation with credit,” but potentially through 
a centralized fund rather than through decentralized bilateral investments.21
a Joint implementation (Ji) mechanism enables industrialized countries to invest 
in climate-friendly projects in other industrialized countries and earn carbon credits 
in exchange. lastly, an emissions trading system creates a market for trading carbon 
credits with countries that are over their target.22
17  Parties and observers, united nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (aug. 1, 2016), 
available at http://unfccc.int/parties_and_observers/items/2704.php.
18  Pollock & Jemison 1999, at 27.
19  a summary of the Kyoto Protocol, united nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (aug. 1, 
2016), available at http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/background/items/2879.php.
20  Climate Change 2007: synthesis report. Contribution of Working groups i, ii and iii to the Fourth 
assessment report of the intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (Core Writing Team, 
r.K. Pachauri & a. reisinger, eds., geneva: iPCC, 2007) (aug. 1, 2016), also available at https://www.
ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/syr/ar4_syr_full_report.pdf.
21  Jonathan Baert Wiener, Global Environmental Regulation: Instrument Choice in Legal Context, 108 Yale 
law Journal 677 (1999).
22  The Global Climate Change Regime, us Council on Foreign relations (aug. 1, 2016), available at http://
www.cfr.org/climate-change/global-climate-change-regime/p21831.
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The Protocol’s first commitment period started in 2008 and ended in 2012, and 
at that time the need for a new international agreement on climate change became 
evident. The global community admitted that the first phase of the Protocol had 
failed to slow global carbon emissions.23 one of the main reasons for this was that it 
was not well thought out enough to make it a realistic way for developed countries to 
reduce their emissions levels. as The New Yorker magazine put it in one article, “[T]he 
best way for a Kyoto signatory to cut its carbon output has been to suffer a well-timed 
industrial implosion…”24 no developed country has succeeded in cutting emissions 
levels unless its economy completely crashed. That does not bode well for future 
attempts to lower ghg emissions.25 The Copenhagen Climate summit, which took 
place in 2009, raised climate change policy to the highest political level and made 
an effort to negotiate for effective global climate change cooperation, including 
improvements to the Clean Development mechanism of the Kyoto Protocol.26 
even though this 15th session of the Conference of the Parties (CoP) produced the 
Copenhagen accord, which clearly expressed the political intent to constrain carbon 
emissions and respond to climate change, in both the short and the long term, again 
the states failed to establish a comprehensive international climate change regime.27 
The unilateral pledges under the Copenhagen accord would limit warming to some 
3˚C by 2100. The document was not legally binding; however, it placed the issue on 
the agenda of future climate change negotiations.28 
one evident reason for the international climate change regime’s deficiency is the 
debate among states over the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities, 
which was created by the rio Declaration on environment and Development29 and 
articulated in the montreal Protocol and the un Framework Convention on Climate 
Change with Kyoto Protocol annexes. many researchers have noted that international 
23  See in detail Has the Kyoto Protocol Made Any Difference to Carbon Emissions?, The guardian, environment 
Blog (aug. 1, 2016), available at https://www.theguardian.com/environment/blog/2012/nov/26/
kyoto-protocol-carbon-emissions; see also Пискулова Н.А. и др. Климатическая политика основных 
торговых партнеров России и ее влияние на экспорт ряда российских регионов [natalia a. 
Piskulova et al., Climate Policy of the Main Trade Partners of Russia and Its Impact on Exports in a Number 
of Russian Regions] (Мoscow: WWF, 2013).
24  David owen, Economy vs. Environment, The new Yorker, march 30, 2009 (aug. 1, 2016), available at 
http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2009/03/30/economy-vs-environment.
25  romain morel & igor shishlov, Ex-Post Evaluation of the Kyoto Protocol: Four Key Lessons for the 2015 
Paris Agreement, 44 Climate report (2014).
26  Copenhagen Climate Change Conference (December 2009) (Jul. 20, 2016), available at http://unfccc.
int/meetings/copenhagen_dec_2009/meeting/6295.php.
27  Id. 
28  anna Korppoo, Russia’s Climate Commitments: Which GDP Growth Contributes to Emissions?, international 
association for energy economics, Fourth Quarter 2010, at 23.
29  rio Declaration on environment and Development, 31 i.l.m. 874 (1992), Principle 7.
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instruments in the field of climate change are highly politicized.30 The principle 
creates tension between developing and developed countries fueled by ongoing 
disagreements over how to interpret it, particularly when it comes to establishing 
and achieving meaningful mitigation targets.31 To begin with, some developing 
countries blame the developed world for having created the global warming crisis 
in the first place, because it was the developed countries that emitted most of the 
carbon dioxide during the 20th century, and vulnerable countries perceive that it 
should be the developed countries that ought to pay to address the challenge.32 
in addition, a delay in compliance with international obligations on the production 
and consumption of ozone-depleting substances in developing countries cannot 
be reconciled with the interests of humanity and future generations, because it 
allows developing countries to increase this production. The fact that the developed 
countries emitted large amounts of oDs previously does not necessarily mean that 
developing countries should now be allowed to emit an equal amount over a similar 
time frame. This would not be sustainable in terms of protecting the climate system 
for the present and future generations, because the concentration of greenhouse 
gases in the atmosphere is already high.
moreover, developing countries have resisted adopting verifiable carbon 
dioxide targets for fear of the impacts on their economies and have chosen not to 
accept commitments under the international documents. on the other hand, as 
efforts to mitigate climate change require the reduction of emissions by all major 
emitters, industrialized countries argue that the dichotomy between developed and 
developing countries is no longer tenable to the extent that emerging economies 
still fall under the category of developing countries without clear and binding 
responsibilities. emerging economies, such as Brazil, China, india, south africa and 
major oil producers, still have an interest in not taking the same responsibilities as 
traditional developed countries.33
30  See Devian K. harris, The Politicization of Climate Change, Thesis, georgia state university, 2012 (Jul. 20, 
2016), available at http://scholarworks.gsu.edu/political_science_theses/49; Соловьянов А.А. 
Озоновый кризис и Монреальский протокол [alexander a. solovyanov, Ozone Crisis and the 
Montreal Protocol] (may 1, 2016), available at http://www.rus-stat.ru/stat/9531998_4.pdf.
31  The Global Climate Change Regime, supra note 22.
32  india’s foreign minister warned in 2007 that “attempts to secure uncompensated ghg abatement 
commitments from developing countries is not the way forward.” he instead pressed for 
“a constructive response recognising common but differentiated responsibilities for the developed 
and developing countries.” mukherjee also argued that “the mitigation (of ghg) regime must not 
reduce the prospects for economic growth and poverty alleviation” in developing countries. See in 
detail Julio godoy, G8 Makes Room at Table for Emerging Five, global Policy Forum, June 1, 2007 (Jul. 15, 
2016), available at https://www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/209/42852.html; see 
also Karl mathiesen, Climate Talks: Should Rich Countries Pay for Damage Caused by Global Warming?, 
The guardian, environment, november 20, 2013 (Jul. 20, 2016), available at https://www.theguardian.
com/environment/2013/nov/20/climate-talks-rich-countries-pay-damage-global-warming.
33  Clara nobbe, Universality, Common but Differentiated Responsibilities and the Sustainable Development 
Goals, sWP Working Paper 7 (Berlin, 2015).
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The architecture for global climate governance looked particularly shaky after 
the 15th CoP failed to overcome entrenched differences among the major Parties 
and deliver targeted emissions cuts. Following Copenhagen, CoP-16, held in 
Cancun, mexico, made some strides towards effective multilateral action, but the 
regime still fell well short of promoting needed action to effect positive change, 
including committing to a post-Kyoto framework. at the launch of the un Framework 
Convention on Climate Change, 17th session of the Conference of the Parties (CoP-17) 
in Durban, south africa, many climate change experts were concerned that the Kyoto 
Protocol could expire in 2012 with no secondary legally binding accord on limiting 
global emissions in place. This fear, however, was somewhat assuaged as the nearly 
two hundred countries present at CoP-17 approved an extension of the Protocol 
through 2017, and potentially 2020. a decision was also reached at the conference to 
draft a successor accord to the Kyoto Protocol by 2015, which would ultimately come 
into force in 2020. Delegates also envisioned that the new accord should include ghg 
emissions targets for all countries, regardless of their level of economic development. 
This framework notably contrasted with that of the Kyoto Protocol, which primarily 
focuses on reducing emissions emanating from developed countries.34
hence, at the end of 2012 the climate change policy of the international community 
entered a new stage. CoP-18, which took place in Doha, Qatar (november–December 
2012), delivered significant results. going into the conference, all the major Parties had 
clearly signaled that they were unlikely to move beyond existing pledges. Countries 
were seeking to conclude negotiations on a second Kyoto Protocol commitment 
period, terminate parallel Convention talks on how to enhance collective climate 
change action by all countries, and give shape and direction to the new process for 
agreeing to a new international climate change treaty in 2015.35
The old approach, as described above, was based on a strict division of 
responsibilities between developed and developing countries. The new approach 
provides unified action by all countries, where the most important role is for 
developing countries, both in the financial infrastructure and in the formation of 
a global climate policy. This approach is characterized by very active actions by the 
countries themselves to develop market-based and non-ghg emissions regulation 
mechanisms. Big emitters, including the BriCs countries, put forward their own 
complementary initiatives.36 For example, the environment ministers from each of the 
BriCs countries met in april 2015 to discuss the crisis of climate change. The success 
34  The Global Climate Change Regime, supra note 22.
35  Dalia Štreimikienė, The 18th Session of the Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Convention 
on Climate Change (UNFCCC) (aug. 1, 2016), available at https://www.mruni.eu/upload/iblock/3ee/
ie-13-7-2-09.pdf. 
36  Кокорин А.О. Современная климатическая политика мирового сообщества и ее значимость для 
России [alexey o. Kokorin, Modern Climate Policy of the International Community and Its Importance 
for Russia] (Мoscow: WWF, 2013).
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of the BriCs environment ministers meeting lay in its decision to launch cooperation 
on environmental issues by setting up a steering committee to coordinate efforts 
and by sharing technologies and best practices. The ministers discussed proposals 
of mutual cooperation to tackle issues of water, air, industrial pollution, waste 
management, and sewerage treatment. in this context, the BriCs Bank, with a $100 
billion corpus, could play a constructive role, investing in the promotion of green 
technology, and providing financial aid to help reduce air pollution.37
The new climate change regime was eventually established in December 2015 in 
Paris where, after 20 years of fraught meetings, negotiators from nearly 200 countries 
signed on to a legal agreement that set ambitious goals to limit temperature rises 
and to hold governments to account for reaching those targets.38 Parties to the un 
Framework Convention on Climate Change adopted the Paris agreement at the 
21st session of the Conference of the Parties. The purpose of the agreement is 
formulated in its article 2 as “holding the increase in the global average temperature 
to well below 2°C above pre-industrial levels and to pursue efforts to limit the 
temperature increase to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels, recognizing that this would 
significantly reduce the risks and impacts of climate change.”39 The goal of limiting 
the global temperature increase to 1.5°C is a big leap below (thus, more stringent 
than) the 2°C that nearly 200 countries had agreed to as a limit six years earlier 
in Copenhagen.40 The agreement will be implemented to reflect equity and the 
principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities, in 
the light of different national circumstances.41 Developing countries are determined 
with a special status expressed in article 4 of the agreement, which says:
Developed country Parties shall continue taking the lead by undertaking 
economy-wide absolute emission reduction targets. Developing country 
Parties should continue enhancing their mitigation efforts, and are 
encouraged to move over time towards economy-wide emission reduction 
or limitation targets in the light of different national circumstances. support 
shall be provided to developing country Parties for the implementation of this 
article, in accordance with articles 9, 10 and 11, recognizing that enhanced 
37  Debidatta aurobinda mahapatra, BRICS to Push Cooperation on Climate Change, russia and india 
report, april 29, 2015 (Jul. 1, 2016), available at https://in.rbth.com/economics/2015/04/29/
brics_to_push_cooperation_on_climate_change_42893.
38  Paris Climate Deal: Nearly 200 Nations Sign In End of Fossil Fuel Era, The guardian, December, 12, 2015 
(Jul. 1, 2016), available at https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2015/dec/12/paris-climate-
deal-200-nations-sign-finish-fossil-fuel-era.
39  Paris agreement to the united nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, art. 2, para. 1(a) 
(aug. 1, 2016), available at http://unfccc.int/paris_agreement/items/9485.php.
40  Paris Climate Deal, supra note 38. 
41  Paris agreement, art. 2, para. 2.
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support for developing country Parties will allow for higher ambition in their 
actions.42
Thus, the agreement sustains the principle of common but differentiated 
responsibilities as articulated in the un Framework Convention on Climate 
Change. 
The agreement introduces a new committing instrument – intended nationally 
Determined Contributions (inDC). Parties, according to article 4, will
prepare, communicate and maintain successive nationally determined 
contributions that… [they] intend to achieve… [and] pursue domestic 
mitigation measures with the aim of achieving the objectives of such 
contributions… each Party shall communicate a nationally determined 
contribution every five years… [and inform CoP] about the outcomes of the 
global stocktake referred to in article 14.
Before the conference in Paris started, more than 180 countries had submitted 
pledges to cut or curb their carbon emissions through inDCs. The inDCs are 
recognized under the agreement, but are not legally binding. a Party may at any 
time adjust its existing nationally determined contribution with a view to enhancing 
its level of ambition, in accordance with guidance adopted by the Conference of the 
Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris agreement.
The Paris agreement will enter into force in 2020.43 The documents inaugurate 
a new era in international climate change regulation with a more ambitious objective 
and a special role for each country Party that clearly defines its targets and formulates 
its implementation action plan. 
3. BRICS Countries’ Domestic Policies and Regulations Related  
to Climate Change
BriCs countries are not an exception in respect of the global climate change 
agenda. all of them are signatory parties to the major international instruments 
governing the impact on the ozone layer and the climate, but BriCs countries are 
given a different status that determines their different roles and responsibilities in 
the climate change regime. in particular Brazil, China, india and south africa are 
in the list of Parties categorized as operating under article 5, paragraph 1 of the 
42 Paris agreement, art. 4, para. 4.
43  as of august 3, 2016, there are 180 signatories to the Paris agreement. of these, 22 states have also 
deposited their instruments of ratification, acceptance or approval accounting in total for 1.08% of 
the total global ghg emissions.
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montreal Protocol,44 which means they are granted a grace period as to the Protocol’s 
commitment, because their level of consumption of the controlled substances 
is less than 0.3 kilograms per capita. russia is in the list of Parties categorized as 
operating under article 2 of the montreal Protocol, meaning the country has the 
imposed obligation to reduce the production and consumption of ozone-depleting 
substances by different means, including:
– cooperate by means of systematic observations, research and 
information exchange in order to better understand and assess the effects 
of human activities on the ozone layer and the effects on human health and 
the environment from modification of the ozone layer;
– adopt appropriate legislative or administrative measures… and policies 
to control, limit, reduce or prevent human activities under their jurisdiction or 
control should it be found that these activities have or are likely to have adverse 
effects resulting from modification or likely modification of the ozone layer;
– cooperate in the formulation of agreed measures, procedures and standards 
for the implementation of… [the Vienna Convention and the Protocol];
– cooperate with competent international bodies to implement 
effectively… [the Convention and the Protocol].45
accordingly, the russian Federation is the only one of the BriCs countries 
included in annex i of the un Framework Convention on Climate Change (as an eiT 
Party),46 i.e. the country assumes special obligations to take all possible measures 
for abatement of ghg emissions.
Brazil, China, india and south africa are non-annex i Parties to the un Framework 
Convention on Climate Change and do not have a formal obligation under the 
Convention and the associated Kyoto Protocol to reduce their ghg emissions. 
however, they are still required to take actions to encourage such reductions. The 
state of their domestic ghg emissions policies may indicate their readiness to 
undertake further binding commitments.
The BriCs nations have undertaken very different role behaviors within the 
international climate change regime. For example, at Copenhagen (CoP-15) in 2009 
russia distanced itself from the other BriCs countries.47 For a long period of time the 
44  article 5 Parties status, ozone secretariat (uneP) (aug. 1, 2016), available at http://ozone.unep.org/
en/article-5-parties-status.
45  Vienna Convention for the Protection of the ozone layer, art. 2.
46  list of annex i Parties to the Convention, united nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(aug. 1, 2016), available at http://unfccc.int/parties_and_observers/parties/annex_i/items/2774.php.
47  niall Duggan, BRICS and the Evolution of a New Agenda Within Global Governance in The European 
Union and the BRICS. Complex Relations in the Era of Global Governance 16 (m. rewizorski, ed., springer 
international Publishing switzerland, 2015).
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country remained largely irrelevant in international negotiations on climate change 
and positioned itself as reluctant to set clear-cut targets and change domestic 
climate-related legislation.48 in contrast, the other BriCs countries have been playing 
a crucial role in international discussions and meetings since 2007.49 
3.1. Brazil
Brazil produces 2.8% of the world’s greenhouse gases and it is considered the 
seventh largest emitter of greenhouse gases according to 2014 World resources 
institute figures.50 however, the majority of its power comes from hydroelectricity. 
Consequently, Brazil’s energy sector contributes little to its ghg emissions. 
unsustainable land use, large livestock numbers, large-scale use of fossil fuels in 
its mineral processing industries and deforestation are the major emission sources. 
Conversely, Brazil is the world’s largest producer and consumer of ethanol, which 
it has added to gasoline, or used as a fuel in its own right, since the 1970s. This has 
reduced both ghg emissions and pollution in urban centers.51 
since early 2000, Brazil has employed significant political effort to adopt climate 
change legislation and policies. as a result, the Brazilian emissions decreased by 41% 
between 2005 and 2012 from the highest reported level in 1996. This is mainly due 
to significant emissions reductions in the forestry and land use sector. Brazil is home 
to the largest part (about 60%) of the amazon rainforest where alarming levels of 
deforestation in the early 2000s contributed to very high emissions.52 however, as 
a result of strong policies to fight deforestation in the amazon, Brazil has turned 
this trend around.
in 2007, the Brazilian government began to reformulate its response to climate 
change. The result was the national Plan on Climate Change finalized in December 
2008. its overall goal was to achieve sustainable economic and social development. 
its main points included:
48  For more information see liliana B. andonova & assia alexieva, Continuity and Change in Russia’s 
Climate Negotiations Position and Strategy, 12(5) Climate Policy 614 (2012).
49  See in detail Fang rong, Understanding Developing Country Stances on Post-2012 Climate Change 
Negotiations: Comparative Analysis of Brazil, China, India, Mexico, and South Africa, 38(8) energy Policy 
4582 (2010).
50  mengpin ge et al., 6 Graphs Explain the World’s Top 10 Emitter, World resources institute, november 25, 
2014 (aug. 1, 2016), available at http://www.wri.org/blog/2014/11/6-graphs-explain-world%e2% 
80%99s-top-10-emitters.
51  e.l. la rovere & a.s. Pereira, Brazil & Climate Change: A Country Profile, sciDev.net, February 14, 2007 
(Jul. 20, 2016), also available at http://www.scidev.net/en/policy-briefs/brazil-climate-change-a-
country-profile.html.
52  Climate action Tracker (Jul. 20, 2016), available at http://climateactiontracker.org/countries/brazil.
html. The “Climate action Tracker” is an independent science-based assessment, which tracks the 
emission commitments and actions of countries. The website provides an up-to-date assessment of 
individual national pledges, targets, and intended nationally determined contributions (inDCs) and 
currently implemented policy to reduce their ghg emissions.
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– increasing energy efficiency leading to a decrease in electricity consumption 
by 10% in 2030, compared to current levels,
– maintaining a high proportion of Brazil’s electricity supply from renewable 
sources (Brazil sourced about 77% of its electricity from renewable sources, mainly 
hydropower, in 2007),
– encouraging the increased use of biofuels in the transport sector (the proportion 
of biofuel use was already high) and work towards a sustainable international market 
for such fuels,
– sustained reduction in de-forestation rates, particularly in the amazon region; 
the aim is to reduce the rate of de-forestation by 70% by 2017 in gradual stages,
– increasing research and development to precisely identify environmental 
impacts and minimize the costs of adaptation, and
– eliminating net loss of forest cover by 2015 through re-forestation and 
establishment of forest plantations.53
Brazil has identified the Kyoto Protocol’s Clean Development mechanism (CDm) 
as the main avenue for international cooperation on climate change matters, though 
the national action Plan noted that changes to the CDm regime may need to be 
made. This strategy comes on top of extensive existing measures that are either 
aimed at mitigating climate change or have that outcome.54
The national Plan on Climate Change was updated after the consultation process 
ended in December 2014. in the updated plan, the country voluntarily establishes 
an emissions reduction target of 36.1% to 38.9% by 2020 with 2005 as a baseline. 
emissions reduction targets are presented for four designated strategic areas: 
deforestation (24.7%), agriculture and livestock (4.9% to 6.1%), energy (6.1% to 
7.7%) and the steel sector (0.3% to 0.4%). The policy leaves specific implementation 
measures to be either established by decree or determined by the second Brazilian 
inventory on ghg emissions and reductions. it also incorporates all laws, measures, 
and policies pertaining to climate change.55
in 2010, the President passed a Decree establishing a nationwide target for 
annual ghg emissions of 2.1bn tons of Co2e by 2020, as compared to the current 
2020 projection of 3.2bn tons of Co2e. This Decree made Brazil the first developing 
country to institute an absolute limit on its ghg emissions. The Decree also requires 
the elaboration of sectoral plans outlining mitigation actions for key economic 
sectors, with targets to be revised on a tri-annual basis. Currently there are eight 
53  leslie nielson, Climate Change Policy: Brazil, China, India and Russia, Parliament of australia, 
Parliament library, February 25, 2009 (Jul. 20, 2016), available at http://www.aph.gov.au/about_ 
Parliament/Parliamentary_Departments/Parliamentary_library/pubs/Bn/0809/ClimateChange 
#_Toc222285937.
54  Executive Summary: National Plan on Climate Change: Brasilia, at 14 (Jul. 20, 2016), available at http://
www.mma.gov.br/estruturas/imprensa/_arquivos/96_11122008040728.pdf.
55  Id.
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sectoral plans, in different phases of implementation: the action Plan to Prevent 
and Control Deforestation in the amazon; the action Plan to Prevent and Control 
Deforestation and Fire in the Cerrado; the low-Carbon agriculture Plan; the Ten-
Year national energy expansion Plan; the Plan for Climate Change mitigation for 
the Consolidation of a low-Carbon economy in the manufacturing industry; the 
low-Carbon mining Plan; the Plan on Transportation and urban mobility for Climate 
Change mitigation; and the health mitigation and adaptation Plan. The agriculture, 
manufacturing industry, mining, and health plans are new plans especially prepared 
in response to the climate legislation, while the other four plans pre-existed the 
national Policy on Climate Change and were taken as sectoral plans.56
in september 2015, Brazil submitted its intended nationally Determined 
Contribution (inDC), with a target to reduce net ghg emissions, including land 
use, land use change, and forestry, by 37% below 2005 levels by 2025. in addition, 
it mentioned an “indicative contribution” to reduce emissions by 43% below 2005 
levels by 2030. The country intends to achieve these targets through a series of 
measures, including reaching a share of 45% renewables in the total energy mix 
by 2030.57
in this way, Brazil becomes one of the first major developing countries that has set 
a high emissions reduction target and emphasizes its willingness to do more in the 
context of an international environmental agreement.58 however, Brazil characterizes 
its actions as conditional on financial support.59 
additionally, policymakers in Brazil argue that investing in a green economy 
that takes the environment and climate into consideration would slow down Brazil’s 
economic growth rate and undermine objectives for social inclusion. This clearly 
illustrates the “prioritization tension” created by the emergence of environmental 
policy issues in the context of poverty reduction. Furthermore, Brazilian policymakers 
are wary of the possibility of developed countries imposing export barriers on other 
countries based on non-adherence to mandates for action on environmental and 
climate issues.60
56  michal nachmany et al., Climate Change Legislation in Brazil: An Excerpt from the 2015 Global Climate 
Legislation Study: A Review of Climate Change Legislation in 99 Countries, at 3 (Jul. 20, 2016), available 
at http://www.lse.ac.uk/granthaminstitute/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/BraZil.pdf.
57  Climate action Tracker, supra note 52.
58  Executive Summary, supra note 54, at 20.
59  Climate action Tracker, supra note 52.
60  lesley Wentworth & Chijioke oji, The Green Economy and the BRICS Countries: Bringing Them Together, 
saiia occasional Paper no. 170 (2013) (Jul. 20, 2016), available at http://www.saiia.org.za/occasional-
papers/479-the-green-economy-and-the-brics-countries-bringing-them-together/file.
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3.2. Russia
russia’s share in global emissions of greenhouse gases is 5.2%,61 making the 
country the fifth biggest emitter in the world.62 russia, unlike other BriCs countries, 
has obligations for systematic reduction of the production and consumption of oDs 
under international agreements. 
The history of the russian Federation’s compliance with the international climate 
change regime was rather difficult in the 1990s. The russian Federation, classified as 
a non-article 5 Party to the montreal Protocol, submitted a statement to the meeting 
of the Parties to the effect that it might not meet compliance requirements for the 
phaseout of halons by 1994, and CFCs by 1996, due in part to the country’s domestic 
conditions. This submission was treated by the secretariat as a submission under 
paragraph 4 of the non-compliance procedure and referred to the implementation 
Committee.63 
at the Conferences of the Parties, the implementation Committee of the ozone 
secretariat noted the situations of non-compliance in the russian Federation with 
the montreal Protocol.64 Through Decision Vii/18 it “allowed” the russian Federation 
to export to the non-article 5 Parties of the former ussr, which had traditionally 
depended on russia for all of its supply of oDs. This implicitly suspended the right of 
the russian Federation to export to other non-article 5 Parties, or to article 5 Parties, 
to meet their basic domestic needs as provided in articles 2a-2F and 2h. in response 
to this development, on 9 December 2000 the Prime minister signed the appeal 
to the Parties to the Vienna Convention and the montreal Protocol, confirming 
russia’s intention to phase out production of oDs as from 20 December 2000 and 
followed this with a set of domestic regulations.65 in 2003, the 15th CoP recognized 
61  UNFCCC Country Brief 2014: Russian Federation, united nations Climate Change secretariat (Jul. 20, 
2016), available at http://newsroom.unfccc.int/media/262717/profile-russia.pdf.
62  ge et al., supra note 50.
63  Parties to the montreal Protocol have issued a number of cautions to non-compliant Parties in 
accordance with paragraph B of the indicative list of measures that might be taken in case of non-
compliance and threatened to consider other measures such as trade restrictions in order to ensure 
that the supply of ozone-depleting substances which are the subject of non-compliance is ceased 
and the exporting Parties are not contributing to the non-compliance situation. See in detail The 
Montreal Protocol: Celebrating 20 Years of Environmental Progress: Ozone Layer and Climate Protection 
88 (D. Kaniaru, ed., london: Cameron may, 2007).
64  Decision Vii/18: Compliance with the montreal Protocol by the russian Federation, ozone secretariat 
(uneP) (aug. 1, 2016), available at http://ozone.unep.org/es/node/27158; Decision iX/31: Compliance 
with the montreal Protocol by the russian Federation, ozone secretariat (uneP) (aug. 1, 2016), 
available at http://ozone.unep.org/en/handbook-montreal-protocol-substances-deplete-ozone-
layer/1749.
65  Русакова Ю.А. Климатическая политика Российской Федерации и решение проблем изменения 
глобального климата, 1(40) Вестник МГИМО-Университета 170 (2015) [Julia a. rusakova, Russian 
Climate Policy and Addressing Global Climate Change, 1(40) herald of the mgimo-university 170 
(2015)].
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and stated its appreciation for the return to full compliance by the russian Federation 
in 2002.66
The ratification of the Kyoto Protocol by russia in 2004 was crucial for the entry 
into force of this international treaty. The Protocol was ratified by Federal law 
no. 128-FZ of november 4, 2004,67 but unfortunately was not followed by any action 
plan or subsequent climate-related legislation. The main legislation on climate and 
emissions mitigation rested mainly on various laws on establishing the domestic 
compliance instruments as required by the Protocol. an important component of 
the Protocol’s framework, the “joint implementation mechanism,” was adopted in 
russian legislation in 2009 in accordance with article 6 of the Protocol.68 regrettably, 
only a few of the joint implementation projects have been approved, as they were 
not considered by the special commission established in the ministry of economic 
Development of russia with the participation of other federal executive bodies and 
were not approved by the relevant ministries.69 
The evolution of the russian emissions limitation pledge for the future climate 
change regime since summer 2009 has been intriguing. in June 2009, russian 
President Dmitry medvedev announced a 2020 emissions reduction target of 10%–
15% below 1990 levels.70 at the eu-russia summit in stockholm in november 2009 he 
pledged a deeper target of 22%–25% over the same period;71 in Copenhagen (at CoP-
15) the negotiation process never reached the stage of bargaining over emissions 
reduction commitments due to fundamental differences between the developed 
and developing country groups. after the summit, the unFCCC secretariat invited 
pledges under the Copenhagen accord by the end of January 2010. This time, the 
russian government took a step back, offering a 15%–25% limitation only from 
66  K. madhava sarma, Compliance with the Montreal Protocol in Making Law Work: Environmental Compliance 
& Sustainable Development Volume 1 287 (D. Zaelke at al., eds., london: Cameron may, 2005).
67  Российская газета от 9 ноября 2004 г. № 3624 [russian newspaper, november 9, 2004, no. 3624]. 
68  Постановление Правительства РФ от 15 сентября 2011 г. № 780 “О порядке утверждения 
и проверки хода реализации проектов, осуществляемых в соответствии со статьей 6 Киотского 
протокола к Рамочной конвенции ООН об изменении климата” [Decree of the government of 
the russian Federation no. 780 of september 15, 2011. on the Procedure for the approval and 
inspection of Projects implemented under article 6 of the Kyoto Protocol to the un Framework 
Convention on Climate Change] (aug. 1, 2016), available at http://www.consultant.ru/document/
cons_doc_laW_119466/.
69  Позиция РСПП по вопросу реализации в Российской Федерации проектов совместного 
осуществления (статья 6 Киотского протокола) [Position of the Russian Union of Industrialists 
and Entrepreneurs on the Issue of Joint Implementation Projects in the Russian Federation] (2009) (aug. 1, 
2016), available at http://www.rspp.ru/position/view/10?year=2009.
70  Conversation between Dmitry Medvedev and Director of News Programmes at Russia’s Channel One, 
Kirill Kleimenov (aug. 1, 2016), available at http://www.kremlin.ru/eng/speeches/2009/06/18/1241_
type82916_218210.shtml.
71  Пресс-конференция по итогам 24-го саммита Россия–ЕС [Press Conference Following the 24th 
EU–Russia Summit] (Jul. 10, 2016), available at http://kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/6034.
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1990 levels.72 Further, at a meeting of domestic stakeholders in February 2010, 
President medvedev confirmed the russian commitment to the 25% below 1990 
levels target.73
The Climate Doctrine, approved in 2009,74 marks a crucial step in russia’s recog-
nition of the potential benefits of mitigation measures and its willingness to engage 
with the international community. although it is not legally binding, the Doctrine is 
a strong statement of intent. it sets strategic guidelines and targets as well as serves as 
a foundation for developing and implementing future climate policy, covering issues 
related to climate change and its consequences. The Doctrine may be characterized 
as a blueprint with which to harmonize domestic climate-related legislation with 
international standards, improve climate monitoring, and stimulate the adoption of 
stronger environmental standards and energy-efficiency and energy-saving measures 
as well as greater use of alternative (including renewable) energy sources. although 
the Climate Doctrine recognizes the potential of russia’s vast forests as a carbon sink 
and recommends their use, it does not set up any major forestry action. 
in 2013, the russian President issued a decree setting out the national domestic 
target for reducing emissions by 2020 to 25% below 1990 levels, and in march 2014 
the ministry of economic Development rolled out a draft action plan to deliver the 
2020 goal. in november 2014, the government also presented a general concept 
for a measuring, reporting, and verification (mrV) system for businesses as one 
of the measures to help attain the 2020 goal. a first set of scenarios on russia’s 
emissions trajectory until 2020 and beyond (2030) has been elaborated within the 
ministerial document Projection of long-term social and economic development 
until 2030 (march 2013), with projected ghg emissions peaking beyond 2020 and 
then declining again to 70% of 1990 levels by 2030.75
on march 31, 2015, the russian Federation submitted to the united nations its 
inDC, proposing to reduce its emissions of net greenhouse gases by 25% to 30% below 
1990 levels by 2030. This official climate action plan was submitted well in advance 
of the Paris CoP.76 “after accounting by experts for forestry this is a reduction of only 
72  Russian submission to the UNFCCC, January 29, 2010 (Jul. 10, 2016), available at http://unfccc.int/files/
meetings/application/pdf/russiacphaccord_app1.pdf.
73  Dmitry medvedev, Opening Remarks at Meeting on Climate Change, February 18, 2010 (Jul. 10, 2016), 
available at http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/48584.
74  Climate Doctrine of the Russian Federation, December 17, 2009 (Jul. 10, 2016), available at http://
en.kremlin.ru/supplement/4822/print.
75  michal nachmany et al., Climate Change Legislation in Russia: An Excerpt from the 2015 Global Climate 
Legislation Study: A Review of Climate Change Legislation in 99 Countries, at 4 (Jul. 20, 2016), available 
at http://www.lse.ac.uk/granthaminstitute/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/russia.pdf.
76  Quentin Buckholz, Russia and Climate Change: A Looming Threat, The Diplomat, February 4, 2016 
(Jul. 20, 2016), available at http://thediplomat.com/2016/02/russia-and-climate-change-a-looming-
threat/.
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6% to 11% below 1990 levels of ghg emissions excluding land use, land use change 
and forestry… and an increase of 30% to 38% compared to 2012 levels.”77 however, 
the ambitious goals announced by the russian Federation are not supported by the 
current federal legislation. The Climate Doctrine of 2009 and the Comprehensive Plan 
for the implementation of the Climate Doctrine for the period up to 2020 adopted 
in 2011 do not contain effective tools to reduce ghg emissions. moreover, the 
Comprehensive Plan is financially provided for neither by the federal budget nor by 
regional budgets and extra budgetary sources.78 state Policy of the russian Federation 
in the Field of environmental Development for the period until 203079 was approved by 
the russian president on 30 april 2012. it declared a number of global environmental 
problems associated with the loss of biodiversity, desertification, and other adverse 
environmental processes alongside the problem of climate change. But this document, 
in comparison with the Climate Doctrine, lacks practical measures, and the ways to 
achieve the targets are not set out. Targets and funding for the implementation of 
climate change goals are dependent on future plans for socio-economic development 
and the federal and regional programs to be adopted. environmental legislation in 
russia has not changed to a large extent in the wording of climate change. a few 
articles have been supplemented to the Federal law “on environmental Protection” 
defining ozone-depleting substances (article 1) and setting the goal of ozone-layer 
protection and the powers of federal authorities in regards to this issue (article 54).80 
These provisions cannot be considered sufficient in terms of establishing a legal 
framework for climate change mitigation in the country.
The basic document regulating the development of the russian energy sector is 
the “energy strategy of russia for the period up to 2030.” The main objective of the 
energy policy is stated as the transition from a fuel and raw material economy model to 
an innovative model of development. however, the strategy assumes that “russia will 
remain a major actor on the world hydrocarbon market and will actively participate in 
the development of electricity markets and coal, as well as the country will strengthen 
its position in the global nuclear power industry.” some provisions of the strategy 
outline priorities in nuclear technology and the hydropower sector. Development of 
77  Climate action Tracker (Jul. 20, 2016), available at http://climateactiontracker.org/countries/
russianfederation.html#Footnote2.
78  Ларсен А.Х. и др. Изменение климата и возможности низкоуглеродной энергетики в России 
[a.h. larsen et al., Climate Change and the Possibility of Low-Carbon Energy in Russia] (Мoscow: rseu, 
2012).
79  Основы государственной политики в области экологического развития Российской Федерации на 
период до 2030 года [Basic Principles of State Environmental Development Policy of the Russian Federation 
through to 2030] (Jul. 20, 2016), available at http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/15177.
80  Федеральный закон от 10 января 2002 г. № 7-ФЗ “Об охране окружающей среды” [Federal law 
no. 7-FZ of January 10, 2002. on environmental Protection] (Jul. 20, 2016), available at http://www.
consultant.ru/document/cons_doc_laW_34823/.
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new renewable energy sources plays a certain role in the country’s energy policy, in 
overall terms of production and consumption of electricity from renewable energy 
sources, excluding hydropower plants whose role is secondary, as the relative volume 
of renewable sources is estimated to be between 0.5% and 4.5%.81 
There are two facts that make the climate change policy of the russian Federation 
divergent from the policies of other BriCs countries.
First, the possible positive effects of climate change that russia predicted in its 
Climate Doctrine. The positive effects are associated with a significant potential for 
effective sectoral and regional economic development, including: 
– reduction in energy consumption during the (e.g., home) heating season;
– improving ice conditions and, consequently, cargo transportation conditions 
in the arctic seas, which would facilitate access to the arctic shelf and its 
development;
– improving the structure and expansion of land devoted to the growing of crops, 
as well as increasing the efficiency of livestock; 
– increasing the productivity of boreal forests.82
according to some projections, countries far north of the equator such as Canada 
and russia could benefit from warmer temperatures as enormous swathes of 
perpetually frozen, barren territory are transformed into arable land and the extraction 
of mineral resources farther north of the arctic Circle becomes possible.83
second, compared to other regions and countries of the planet, russia has 
a higher adaptive capacity owing to its large territory, significant water resources, 
and a relatively small proportion of the population living in areas vulnerable to 
climate change.84
Together, these two facts may be one reason for the country not being ambitious 
in setting targets for ozone-depleting emissions reductions and standing aside 
from active discussion of climate issues. another possible reason is that russia is 
a major fossil fuel producer, and the fact that the country’s economy is heavily based 
on this underlies russia’s historically skeptical attitude regarding the necessity of 
international action on climate change and its slow movement in domestic legislation 
on climate issues.85 however, this limited and optimistic view appears misguided. it 
81  Распоряжение Правительства РФ от 13 ноября 2009 г. № 1715-р “Об Энергетической стратегии 
России на период до 2030 года” [Decree of the government of the russian Federation no. 1715-r 
of november 13, 2009. on the energy strategy of russia for the Period up to 2030] (Jul. 20, 2016), 
available at http://www.consultant.ru/document/cons_doc_laW_94054/.
82  Climate Doctrine of the Russian Federation, supra note 74, para 28.
83  Buckholz, supra note 75.
84  Climate Doctrine of the Russian Federation, supra note 74, para 29.
85  For more on this see eva hartog, Won’t Change Russia’s Attitude to Climate Change, The moscow Times, 
December 2, 2015 (Jul. 20, 2016), available at https://themoscowtimes.com/articles/less-fur-more-
oil-why-paris-wont-change-russias-attitude-to-climate-change-51051.
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is increasingly clear that climate change is likely to adversely affect russia in several 
ways, from severe weather events to territorial loss to growing instability in the 
country’s southern periphery and in its major cities. 
The russian government has developed a number of non-climate-specific laws 
that could benefit efforts to reduce ghg emissions, which is a constructive political 
initiative that sends a strong signal of intent, although russia should improve its 
standing in international climate negotiations by strengthening the climate-specific 
legislation. The implementation of the regulations in place should also be strictly 
controlled.86
3.3. India
india is now the world’s fourth largest emitter of greenhouse gases.87 Between 
1990 and 2004 emissions increased by 97% – one of the highest rates of increase 
in the world.88 
india’s compliance with climate change agreements in 2000–2011 is quite difficult 
to assess, as the data underlying the target is not available.89 under the national Fuel 
Policy issued in 2003 the following measures were implemented:
– new four-wheel vehicles to meet european emissions standards by 2010,
– conversion of public transport and taxies to compressed natural gas fuel,
– expansion of urban mass-transport systems, and
– expansion of ethanol–blended gasoline sales.
in addition, the government made efforts to expand the amount of forest cover 
in india by 1%.90 
a new policy in india was given life in June 2008, when the indian Prime ministers 
Council on Climate Change released india’s national action Plan on Climate Change 
(naPCC).91 This document primarily offers a list of eight technological efforts, the 
pride of place being given to research and development of solar energy, but it does 
not set any numerical goals for emissions reductions or for energy intensity. The Plan 
86  alina Yablokova, Russia at COP21: An Opportunity to Reengage with the West, russian international 
affairs Council, november 27, 2015 (Jul. 20, 2016), available at http://russiancouncil.ru/en/
inner/?id_4=6910.
87  ge et al., supra note 50.
88  Human Development Report 2007/08, united nations Development Program, at 42 and 152 (Jul. 20, 2016), 
available at http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/reports/268/hdr_20072008_en_complete.pdf.
89  Climate action Tracker (Jul. 20, 2016), available at http://climateactiontracker.org/countries/india/2011.
html.
90  Climate Change Mitigation Measures in India, Pew Centre on global Climate Change, international 
Brief 2, september 2008 (Jul. 12, 2016), available at http://www.pewclimate.org/docuploads/india-
Factsheet-09-08.pdf.
91  National Action Plan on Climate Change, government of india, Prime minister’s Council on Climate 
Change (2008) (Jul. 25, 2016), available at http://www.moef.nic.in/sites/default/files/Pg01-52_2.pdf.
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outlines eight national missions: the national solar mission, the national mission 
for enhanced energy efficiency, the national mission for a green india (focusing 
on increasing india’s forest cover), the national mission on strategic Knowledge 
(aiming at establishing a research fund), the national Water mission, the national 
mission on sustainable habitat, the national mission for sustaining the himalayan 
ecosystem (aiming at helping protect india’s water supply), and the national mission 
for sustainable agriculture.92
The focus of the naPCC is on promoting understanding of climate change 
and action on adaptation, mitigation, energy efficiency, and the conservation of 
natural resources while pursuing overall economic growth.93 Four new missions 
were announced under the naPCC in 2014 – the national Wind energy mission, the 
national human health mission, the national Coastal resources mission, and the 
national Waste-to-energy mission.94
in addition, the country introduced energy efficiency and conservation measures 
with the national mission on enhanced energy efficiency, which was approved in 
2010. a number of regulations and incentives promote energy efficiency and the 
use of renewable energy at the federal and state levels. These include a revision in 
2007 of the energy Conservation Building Code that sets minimum requirements 
for building envelope components, lighting, electrical systems, and water heating 
and pumping systems. in august 2014, the government approved the national 
mission on enhanced energy efficiency (nmeee). This effort enhances investments 
for better technology, the creation of venture capital with a partial risk guarantee 
fund, an appliance rating system, and notification of a new building code for energy 
conservation. energy legislation also includes the electricity act of 2003, which sought 
to better coordinate the development of the power sector and to promote efficient 
and environmentally benign policies. The act recognizes the role of renewable energy 
in the country’s national electricity Policy (issued in 2005) and contains key provisions 
relating to renewable energy. The 2006 integrated energy Policy that received Cabinet 
approval in 2008 aims to meet energy demand “at the least cost in a technically 
efficient, economically viable and environmentally sustainable manner.” it contains 
a number of policies that contribute to avoiding ghg emissions.95
india is a non-annex i country under the Kyoto Protocol and thus has no binding 
target for emissions reduction. nonetheless, it is an active participant in the Clean 
Development mechanism (CDm) established by the Kyoto Protocol. The country 
92 National Action Plan on Climate Change, supra note 91.
93  michal nachmany et al., Climate Change Legislation in India: An Excerpt from the 2015 Global Climate 
Legislation Study: A Review of Climate Change Legislation in 99 Countries, at 2 (Jul. 25, 2016), available 
at http://www.lse.ac.uk/granthaminstitute/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/inDia.pdf.
94  Id. at 3.
95  Id. at 4.
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had more than 1,479 registered CDm projects as of February 2014. in 2010, india 
released a ghg inventory for 2007 and stated that it would be the first developing 
country to publish its emissions inventory in a two-year cycle going forward. efforts 
by india include improved energy efficiency, increased use of renewable and nuclear 
power, expanded public transportation, and energy pricing reform. rather than 
integrative binding legislation, india is developing a policy process to specifically 
target climate change. 
on october 1, 2015, india submitted its inDC, including the targets to lower the 
emissions intensity of gDP by 33% to 35% below 2005 levels by 2030, to increase 
the share of non-fossil-based power generation capacity to 40% of installed electric 
power capacity by 2030 (equivalent to 26%–30% of power generation in 2030), and 
to create an additional (cumulative) carbon sink of 2.5–3 gtCo2e through additional 
forest and tree cover by 2030. For 2020, india earlier put forward a pledge to reduce 
the emissions intensity of gDP by 20% to 25% below 2005 levels by 2020. according 
to expert analysis, with the policies it already has in place india will achieve an 
emissions intensity reduction of around 41.5% below 2005 levels by 2030.96 it is 
obvious that this ambitious goal is in line with the country’s current policies. 
3.4. China
China is the world’s number one emitter of greenhouse gases97 and the country 
that has officially identified that climate changes due to global warming are already 
occurring in its territory.98 
China’s actions to tackle climate change have focused mainly on energy 
production and energy efficiency. Climate change was first officially referred to in 
legislation and regulations in China’s national Climate Change Program released in 
June 2007.99 The Program outlined activities both to mitigate ghg emissions and 
to adapt to the consequences of potential climate change. Within the Program, 
perhaps most challenging was China’s goal to lower its energy intensity. related 
goals include more than doubling renewable energy use by 2020, expansion of 
nuclear, gas, and renewable generated power to displace the use of coal-fired power, 
closure of inefficient industrial facilities, tightened efficiency standards for buildings 
96  Climate action Tracker, supra note 89.
97  ge et al., supra note 50.
98  gorild heggelund, China’s Climate Change Policy: Domestic and International Developments, 31(2) 
asian Perspective 166 (2007); China’s National Climate Change Program, People’s republic of China, 
national Development and reform Commission, at 4–6 (Jul. 25, 2016), available at http://en.ndrc.
gov.cn/newsrelease/200706/P020070604561191006823.pdf. 
99  michal nachmany et al., Climate Change Legislation in China: An Excerpt from the 2015 Global Climate 
Legislation Study: A Review of Climate Change Legislation in 99 Countries, at 2 (Jul. 25, 2016), available 
at http://www.lse.ac.uk/granthaminstitute/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/China.pdf.
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and appliances, and forest cover expansion of 20%.100 however, it is a notable feature 
of this Program that it rejected mandatory limits on emissions.
recent political and legislative reforms by the country in the area of climate 
change have included:
– The renewable energy law has been effective since February 2005 and mandates 
that 16% of all energy is to come from wind, biomass, solar, and hydropower energy 
by 2020.
– one of China’s main concerns is to promote the development of nuclear power 
as part of its national energy strategy. in 2008, the national energy administration 
raised its target to 5% of installed capacity by 2020.
– China has ambitious goals to improve power sector efficiency by 
decommissioning small, inefficient power generators and accelerating the 
deployment of very advanced power plant technology (e.g., “supercritical” and “ultra-
supercritical” combustion technology).
– The coal-bed methane industry is being actively developed because capturing 
methane (Ch4) released during coal production and using it as a fuel both reduces 
emissions and substitutes for other fuel use and emissions.
– The Top-1000 enterprise efficiency Program was established in 2006 and aims 
to reduce energy use by China’s 1,000 most energy-intensive enterprises. These 
enterprises consume one-third of the country’s energy and emit the bulk of China’s 
ghg pollution. 
– The non-military building sector accounts for some 28% of national energy 
consumption. new buildings constructed between 2006 and 2010 were subject to 
a design standard that improved energy conservation by 50%; in major cities (e.g., 
Beijing) buildings are subject to a 65% energy-saving standard.
– China makes more consumer appliances than any other country. in order to cut 
electricity growth and ghg emissions, China established energy efficiency standards 
and labels for lighting, air conditioners, and home appliances. The standards set 
a target of reducing residential electricity use by 10% by 2010.
– in 2006, China announced the decommissioning of hundreds of small, old 
industrial plants. many of the plants were in the cement and steel sectors, but other 
chemical, refining, and manufacturing facilities were slated for closure as well.101 
These measures are repeated in China’s Policies and actions for addressing Climate 
Change (2008). in 2009, the national People’s Congress passed a comprehensive 
Climate Change resolution. Technically, this is not a set of laws, but policy documents 
100  Jane a. leggett et al., China’s Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Mitigation Policies, Crs report for 
Congress, september 10, 2008, at 18 (Jul. 20, 2016), available at http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/
rl34659_20080910.pdf.
101  Id. at 19; see also Climate Change Mitigation Measures in the People’s Republic of China, Pew Centre 
on global Climate Change, international Brief 1, april 2007 (Jul. 12, 2016), available at http://www.
pewclimate.org/docuploads/international%20Brief%20-%20China.pdf.
ELENA GLADUN, DEWAN AHSAN 33
guiding legislation. although there is not yet a comprehensive climate change law in 
China, in 2010 the government announced that China would begin work on climate 
change legislation.102 
China’s domestic climate-related laws are dominated by a focus on saving energy, 
reflecting the need to improve energy efficiency to enable the country to keep pace 
with energy demand as the economy grows strongly. China has passed an energy 
Conservation law and the 2005 renewable energy law and is planning a new energy 
law, the official draft of which contains 14 chapters totaling 140 articles. The chapters 
are: general Principles, energy Comprehensive management, energy strategy and 
Planning, energy exploration and Transfer, energy supply and service, energy 
Conservation, energy reservation, emergency supplies, energy in suburban areas, 
energy Price and Taxes, energy Technology, international Co-operation, monitoring 
and investigation, and legal responsibilities. The goals are relatively vague, with 
clearer targets to be set by ministries, including the national Development and 
reform Commission (nDrC), ministry of Construction, ministry of agriculture, ministry 
of Transportation, and the Bureau for Tax. China’s 12th Five-Year Plan, published in 
2011, includes the target to reduce the carbon intensity of the economy by 17% 
of 2010 levels by 2015, which is in line with the 40%–45% from the 2005 target by 
2020 committed to under the Copenhagen accord.103 experts believe that further 
reductions could be possible if financial resources are made available.104
in July 2013, to strengthen top-level planning on climate change, the state 
Council adjusted the composition and personnel of the national leading group 
for addressing Climate Change. all provinces established their own leading groups 
to address climate change, with the provincial governors chairing the groups. 
To underpin China’s top-level planning on climate change, the nDrC developed 
a national Plan to address Climate Change (2014–2020) that outlines the framework 
for addressing climate change in China, including targets, tasks, and safeguarding 
measures. under this framework, all provinces and municipalities must develop their 
own plans. The future of China’s climate policy will be heavily influenced by the 13th 
Five-Year Plan (2016–2020), which was endorsed in march 2016.105
it is important to note that China is an active participant in the Clean Development 
mechanism, accounting for over 40% of the global emissions credits arising from 
such projects.106 This may be a pointer as to its preferred way of participating in any 
new international ghg emissions-control agreement.
102  nachmany et al., supra note 99, at 2.
103  Id. at 2–3.
104  Climate action Tracker (Jul. 25, 2016), available at http://climateactiontracker.org/countries/
china/2011.html.
105  nachmany et al., supra note 99, at 3.
106  Climate Change Mitigation Measures, supra note 101.
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on June 30, 2015, China submitted its inDC, which includes the following targets: 
peak Co2 emissions by 2030 at the latest, lower the carbon intensity of gDP by 60% 
to 65% below 2005 levels by 2030, increase the share of non-fossil energy carriers of 
the total primary energy supply to around 20% by that time, and increase its forest 
stock volume by 4.5 billion cubic meters compared to 2005 levels. however, the 
emissions resulting from the 2030 carbon intensity targets if taken in isolation are 
significantly higher. China’s inDC actions and non-fossil energy target lead to ghg 
emissions levels of around 13.6 gtCo2e in 2030 and to an improvement of carbon 
intensity of 70%. The inDC carbon intensity target, if it dominates other elements of 
the inDC, national policies, and actions, would lead to much higher 2030 emissions 
levels.107
3.5. South Africa
south africa joined BriCs in December 2010, at the invitation of China.108 as 
a developing country with high levels of poverty and perhaps the world’s most 
serious crisis of unemployment, south africa needs its economy to grow as rapidly 
as possible. in light of this, the country continuously measures how its economic 
development goals are compatible with climate change commitments.
south africa is undertaking mitigation actions which will result in a deviation 
below the current emissions baseline of around 34% by 2020 and by around 42% by 
2025. This target was proposed during the Copenhagen negotiations and submitted 
to the Copenhagen accord on 29 January 2010. This level of effort enables south 
africa’s emissions to peak between 2020 and 2025, plateau for approximately 
a decade, and decline in absolute terms thereafter. This undertaking is conditional 
on a fair, ambitious, and effective agreement in the international climate change 
negotiations under the Climate Change Convention and the Kyoto Protocol and 
the provision of support from the international community.109 To achieve the target, 
south africa has launched an ambitious african renewable energy initiative (arei). 
The launch of the initiative, which aims to produce 300 gigawatts of electricity for 
the continent by 2030, is a demonstration of africa’s willingness to cooperate in 
the un climate negotiations. The initiative’s goals are to help achieve sustainable 
development, enhance well-being, and foster sound economic development by 
ensuring universal access to sufficient amounts of clean, appropriate, and affordable 
energy. The project also aims to help african countries leapfrog towards renewable 
107  Climate action Tracker, supra note 104.
108  The Response of China, India and Brazil to Climate Change: A Perspective for South Africa 1 (university 
of oxford: smith school of enterprise and the environment, 2012).
109  Climate action Tracker (Jul. 25, 2016), available at http://climateactiontracker.org/countries/
southafrica/2011.html.
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energy systems that support their low-carbon development strategies while 
enhancing economic and energy security.110
south africa considers the growth of a competitive renewable energy sector a key 
element for developing a green economy. south africa’s rationale for investing in 
renewable energy is mainly the creation of “green jobs” through small- and medium-
sized enterprises, while maintaining the environment by reducing carbon emissions 
and diversifying its energy mix to ensure energy security. south africa showed its 
dedication to transitioning to low-carbon technologies and the development of 
a green economy in its national Development Plan which was released in 2011. 
The Plan detailed the country’s strategy for national growth until 2030 and called 
for a tax on carbon by 2015.111
on september 25, 2015, south africa submitted its inDC, which includes the 
target of reducing its ghg emissions to a 20%–82% increase on 1990 levels.112 
according to experts’ analyses, south africa will need to implement additional 
policies to reach its proposed targets.113
4. Conclusion – The Increasing Role of the BRICS Countries in the 
Implementation of Global Climate Change Goals
Brazil, russia, india, China, and south africa, due to their rapid economic growth 
and high rates of energy consumption, are among the top ghg emitters in the 
world. The economic growth and increased energy demands of BriCs countries will 
continue to have significant impact on climate change. 
The international climate change regime has sustained the principle of common 
but differentiated responsibilities from the time of the adoption of the montreal 
Protocol to the signing of the Paris agreement by a majority of the world’s countries. 
Though developing countries, including four of the BriCs countries, are not legally 
bound to take measures and have the right to financial support in their mitigation 
and adaptation process, an effective climate change regime should bring on board 
and place responsibility on all major ghg emitters in an equitable manner “without 
ignoring the historical responsibilities on the part of developed countries.”114 While the 
110  AfDB to Support Electricity Access for All by 2030 with African Renewable Energy Initiative, african 
Development Bank group, December 2, 2015 (aug. 1, 2016), available at http://www.afdb.org/en/
news-and-events/article/afdb-to-support-electricity-access-for-all-by-2030-with-african-renewable-
energy-initiative-15119.
111  Wentworth & oji, supra note 60.
112  Climate action Tracker, supra note 109.
113  Id.
114  rafael leal-arcas, BRICS and Climate Change, 4(1) international affairs Forum 1 (2013).
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substance of the climate actions to be taken by developed and developing countries 
may differ, they should be enshrined in a single international legal instrument.
one of the reasons for BriCs countries to take more active part in the international 
climate talks is their exposure to high climate change risks. The record shows 
a close connection between a country’s economic well-being and the extent of 
its vulnerability to the risk of catastrophic losses from climate change.115 like many 
other developing countries, Brazil, india, and south africa face frequent financial 
and material losses from natural hazards, and anthropogenic climate change 
exacerbates old hazards and generates new ones, affecting their assets, including 
human, physical, and socioeconomic assets, and causes widespread indirect losses.116 
The leaders of these countries understand that their national ambitions and the 
stability of their societies are threatened by climate change. The “rich world” can – 
for a while at least – afford to adapt. Developing countries, with much lower per 
capita incomes, have much less room to maneuver.117
another reason to foster climate change policy and related legislation in BriCs 
states is the hope of acquiring a range of financial mechanisms to achieve their 
climate goals. For example, the BriCs countries (excluding russia) have demanded 
that the developed countries provide funds to the proposed green Climate Fund 
and technology to developing countries for better adaptation and mitigation in 
response to climate change.118 The governments of Brazil, india, and China have been 
successful in encouraging the operation of the Clean Development mechanism in 
their countries. at the same time, russia has demonstrated its unwillingness to use 
this or other financial instruments proposed by the international climate change 
regime, and there remains the inability of international instruments to overcome 
bureaucratic obstacles at the domestic russian level. 
as illustrated above, the BriCs nations have undertaken very different role 
behaviors in the realm of climate change governance. additionally, on the theme 
of climate finance, it is important to bear in mind the divergent approach taken by 
russia and the BasiC bloc (Brazil, south africa, india, and China). While all countries 
agree on strongly demanding the application of “Common but Differentiated 
115  See in detail Storm Alert: Natural Disasters Can Damage Sovereign Creditworthiness, standard & Poor’s 
ratings services, september 10, 2015 (aug. 1, 2016), available at http://unepfi.org/pdc/wp-content/
uploads/stormalert.pdf.
116  Mechanisms to Manage Financial Risks from Direct Impacts of Climate Change: Technical Paper, united 
nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (2008), at 28 (aug. 1, 2016), available at http://
unfccc.int/resource/docs/2008/tp/09.pdf.
117  Could China and Its Fellow BRICS Nations Lead the Way on Climate Change?, The guardian, environmental 
sustainability, Poverty matters Blog (aug. 1, 2016), available at https://www.theguardian.com/global-
development/poverty-matters/2013/jan/28/china-brics-lead-climate-change.
118  See li Xing, The BRICS and Beyond: The International Political Economy of the Emergence of a New World 
Order (routledge, 2014).
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responsibilities and respective Capabilities” (CBDr-rC) as well as a right-to-develop 
approach, russia aligns itself with the position of its own negotiating scheme.119
until 2012, four BriCs countries (excluding russia), as developing economies, 
were not obliged to comply with the Kyoto Protocol directive of the un Framework 
Convention on Climate Change to reduce ghg emissions. But, with the Protocol 
having ended in 2012, and a new global agreement needed to curb emissions, BriCs 
countries have taken up voluntary emissions reduction targets in recent years. For 
instance, Brazil has committed to reduce its emissions by 36%–39% below 1990 
levels by 2020. india has pledged to reduce its emissions by 20%–25% below 2005 
levels by 2020; China’s pledge is to reduce its emissions by 40%–45% per unit of 
gDP by 2020 compared to 2005 levels; while south africa has committed to reduce 
its ghg emissions by 34% by 2020 and 42% by 2025. The emissions targets are, 
however, not subject to a legally binding instrument, and this means that countries 
may opt out. russia’s position is interesting in this group. it did not support the 
Kyoto Protocol second commitment period and always stated the position that both 
developed and developing countries should have binding obligations. nevertheless, 
the country has made voluntary pledges under the Paris agreement to reduce its 
emissions to 25%–30% below 1990 levels by 2030 and in 2015 showed its willingness 
in committing to the targets.
it is evident that all the BriCs countries position themselves as active actors in 
the international climate change arena, setting goals according to their economic 
possibilities and political willingness. however, ensuring compliance with 
international commitments is one of the main challenges for the BriCs countries. 
Proper implementation of many of the new climate targets will involve a great deal 
of commitment from the states. it is unrealistic, however, to assume that all BriCs 
states have the same institutional and financial capacity to implement these goals 
at once or within the same period. The differences in the domestic policies and 
regulations related to climate issues is stark.
To summarize the efforts and results in changing the domestic policy and legislation 
in the BriCs countries, it would be reasonable to mention that climate change has 
undoubtedly become a key concern for the governments of all the countries as they 
endeavor to align climate change issues as a priority for state development. all BriCs 
countries have adopted climate change strategies in which they outline the steps 
necessary to achieve the emissions reduction goals. With regard to the legislation 
without which climate change policies are unlikely to be realized, it is clear that Brazil, 
india, and China have been quite successful in adopting new laws and regulations. 
The three countries are taking action on many fronts to regulate environmental 
issues, natural resource management, agriculture, forest regulations, and climate 
119  alice amorim, BRICS Analysis: Climate Finance and INDC commitments, nivela, november 21, 2015 
(aug. 1, 2016), available at http://www.nivela.org/articles/brics-analysis-climate-finance-and-indc-
commitments/en.
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change mitigation. on the contrary, russian domestic climate-related legislation (laws 
on environmental protection, forest management, and agriculture) remains weak 
due to the lack of efficient legal instruments, economic incentives, and political will. 
While Brazil, india, and China also address a number of other sustainability issues, 
such as pollution, energy efficiency, and the use of non-fossil fuel sources of energy, 
russia, in its energy strategy, confirms priorities in the hydrocarbon, nuclear, and 
hydropower sectors. russian plans on the development of new renewable energy 
sources are vague. at the same time, india and China are becoming global leaders 
in the renewable energy sector, developing legislation on alternative sources (solar 
energy, wind energy). The same is true for Brazil, which has proven to be a world leader 
in low carbon agriculture and biofuels. however, with the boom in Brazil’s oil and gas 
industry, its ghg emissions from fossil fuels are projected to increase rapidly.
For better implementation of climate change targets it is crucial to enact regional 
programs, which are on the rise in China’s provinces and india’s states, while in russia 
funding for the implementation of climate change goals is dependent on future plans 
for socio-economic development and government programs still to be adopted.
one of the main areas and the topic of dialogue among the BriCs countries 
is sustainable development, environmental protection, and the climate change 
problem.120 This means that all BriCs countries need to foster further discussion and 
cooperation on climate change regulations and work out a unified legislation at their 
domestic levels. They could strive for developing an obligatory legal framework to 
fight climate change collectively. This possibility was mentioned, for example, at 
the environmental ministers meeting where they discussed proposals of mutual 
cooperation to tackle issues of water, air, industrial pollution, waste management, 
and sewerage treatment.121 especially for russia, it could be beneficial to borrow 
from its BriCs partners’ experience in effective regulations on energy efficiency, 
industry standards, and best available technology, which could help in effective 
implementation of climate change targets.
as clearly seen from the analysis above, the BriCs countries are already doing 
much in the area of the green economy. The executive director of the united nations 
environmental Program, achim steiner, at the BriCs environmental ministers meeting 
in moscow, highlighted some of the progress made in renewables among BriCs 
countries. he mentioned that in recent years China has had the biggest renewable 
energy investments, at us $83.3 billion; south africa had a 5% increase in renewable 
energy investment equal to us $5.5 billion in 2014; Brazil’s investments in renewables 
120  See in detail Трифонов В.И. Взаимодействие стран БРИКС в международных структурах [Victor i. 
Trifonov, Interaction of the BRICS Countries in International Structures] in Стратегия России в БРИКС: 
цели и инструменты [Russia’s Strategy in BRICS: Objectives and Instruments] (V.a. nikonov, g.D. Tolorai, 
eds., Мoscow: PFur, 2013).
121  mahapatra, supra note 37.
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amounted to us $7.4 billion, with wind attracting 84% of that investment. india’s 
renewable energy investment reached us $2.4 billion in 2014, with wind attracting 
nearly half of the total investment; and india pledges to raise solar production to 
100 gigawatts by 2022.122
energy has featured in the declarations of the BriCs group since its inception, 
as has reference to the green economy and climate change. individually, there 
have been areas where BriCs have become leaders in technologies: three of the 
top five solar photovoltaic firms are Chinese, while in the wind sector indian and 
Chinese companies are also among the leaders.123 at the same time, russia is a major 
fossil fuel producer and south africa has vast deposits of coal. The main challenges 
for renewable energy development in russia are the lack of financial support 
mechanisms and a deficit of related legislation. research in the area does not receive 
proper state support, and there is no system of special industrial standards.
Clearly, the commitment of the BriCs countries largely depends on developed 
countries taking action first and providing funding to developing countries for mitigation 
and adaptation measures, which include renewable technologies. Considering that 
russia is an annex i Party to the un Framework Convention on Climate Change 
and a powerful leader within its region, any contributions on finance and means of 
implementation would be expected to place russia in a donor position rather than in 
a position as a recipient, as most of BriCs countries’ cohorts posit themselves. exact 
figures on national climate finance contribution are scant in russia, but the country does 
arguably provide support to former soviet countries and other allies.124 For instance, 
russia made a unique contribution towards supporting the sustainable Development 
goals in countries in europe, the Cis, and beyond in april 2016 in the framework of the 
russia-unDP Trust Fund established in June 2015, which launched with initial funding of 
us $25 million. The Fund was designed to help “mitigate the negative effects of climate 
change,” according to a russian government decree of april 2016.125 
also, cooperation between russia and india in the energy sector is on the rise, and 
though more evident in sectors such as oil, gas, and nuclear power, the renewable 
sector is slowly gaining momentum. While russia has participated in a number of 
122  agathe maupin & elizabeth sidiropoulos, BRICS and Climate Change, south african institute of 
international affairs, July 6, 2015 (aug. 1, 2016), available at http://www.saiia.org.za/opinion-analysis/
brics-and-climate-change.
123  BRICS Environment Ministers Discuss Green Economy, Climate Change, Climate Change Policy and 
Practice, news, april 22, 2015 (aug. 1, 2016), available at http://climate-l.iisd.org/news/brics-
environment-ministers-discuss-green-economy-climate-change/.
124  amorim, supra note 118.
125  Russia Pledges $10 Million to Help Mitigate Climate Impact in Developing Countries, united nations 
Development Programme in europe and Central asia, april 22, 2016 (aug. 1, 2016), available at 
http://www.eurasia.undp.org/content/rbec/en/home/presscenter/pressreleases/2016/04/22/russia-
pledges-10-million-to-help-mitigate-climate-impact-in-developing-countries.html.
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hydropower projects across india, the promising solar sector lags behind. The russian 
energy agency and solar energy Corporation of india signed a memorandum of 
understanding for several large-scale solar photovoltaic power plants in December 
2015. The initial pilot project of up to 500 mW is, however, just at the “initial planning 
stage.”126 Thus, russia and the other BriCs countries have the potential to cooperate 
in the field of renewable energy through the exchange of technology, investment in 
the sector, and the participation of their energy companies in each other’s domestic 
market. initiating joint renewable energy projects with other BriCs states, russia will 
be able to fulfill its commitment obligations under article 4 of the un Framework 
Convention on Climate Change and article 9 of the Paris agreement, i.e. “take all 
practicable steps to promote, facilitate and finance the transfer of, or access to, 
environmentally sound technologies and know-how to other Parties, particularly 
developing country Parties, to enable them to implement the provisions of the 
Convention.”127 on the assumption that russia will support the development and 
enhancement of endogenous capacities and technologies of BriCs countries, it can 
take a leadership position in the group. 
in the various international discussions and meetings on climate change 
(including CoP processes) BriCs countries do not negotiate as a group. all the BriCs 
countries (barring russia) are part of a larger group, the g77 + China group, which 
includes smaller groups such as the least Developed Countries (lDC), among others. 
in addition, four of the five BriCs countries are members of the informal grouping 
created at the Copenhagen summit in 2009, the BasiC group. These countries have 
been meeting on the margins of various global gatherings, with their most recent 
meeting and ministerial statement taking place in June 2015 at the un headquarters 
in new York City.128 at the Copenhagen Climate Conference in 2009, russia distanced 
itself from the other BriCs countries.129 This might be considered a deficiency in 
strengthening the BriCs role in global governance. What is clear though is that the 
BriCs countries have a responsibility to play a central role together with players 
from the industrialized world in driving climate change negotiations, leading to 
effective binding regulations in 2020–2030. moreover, it is important for the russian 
Federation to show more leadership in this area so as to maintain credibility on the 
world stage. in any event, the BriCs countries cannot afford to ignore this issue, 
because one of them, russia, is the world’s largest producer of energy resources and 
another, China, is the world’s greatest consumer of these resources. 
To change the situation, the BriCs environment ministers at their first meeting 
in 2015 in russia decided to: establish a Working group on the environment to 
126  From Russia with Solar Energy, BriCs, July 18, 2016 (aug. 1, 2016), available at http://infobrics.org/
russia/news/2016/07/18/8942/.
127  united nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, art. 4.
128  maupin & sidiropoulos, supra note 122.
129  Duggan 2015, at 16. 
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identify and discuss priority areas of cooperation; explore the potential of the 
BriCs new Development Bank for funding environmental projects; explore the 
possibility of establishing a collaborative platform of the BriCs countries, intended 
to share best environmental practices and facilitate the exchange of environmentally 
sound technologies and know-how with the participation of public and private 
stakeholders; and hold regular meetings of the environment ministers of BriCs.130 
BriCs is capable of serving as a useful platform in two ways: first, to seek convergence 
among its members (given their different priorities and approaches) and, second, 
to prepare and present a common position, which would carry the weight of the 
entire group in the global arena.131 The climate change issue could be a key issue 
enabling the BriCs countries, acting as a bloc, to take the lead in the discourse on 
sustainable development and climate change, the format of which will undergo 
inevitable changes in the coming decades.
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